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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s four major gay and lesbian rights
decisions—Romer v. Evans, 1 Lawrence v. Texas,2 United States v.
Windsor, 3 and Obergefell v. Hodges 4—were not cases about the First
Amendment or religion. But collectively, often implicitly and
sometimes explicitly, these cases teach us something about the
role which religion should play in questions of constitutional
equality and liberty.
These gay and lesbian rights cases, especially the first
three, have been understood to stand for the principle that
government may not enact laws aimed at expressing moral
disapproval, or “animus,” toward homosexuality or same-sex
relationships. 5 In turn, this association between animus and
opposition to gay and lesbian equality has led some
commentators (and dissenting justices) to accuse the Court’s
majority of imposing an “orthodoxy” 6 and of demonstrating
hostility toward Americans whose religious views lead them to
oppose homosexuality or legal rights for gays and lesbians.
This criticism, however, misses the mark, because it
confuses religious belief and advocacy by private persons and
organizations, on the one hand, with the imposition of religionbased policies by government, on the other. In Lawrence and
Obergefell in particular, the Court went out of its way to
acknowledge that many people supported laws restricting gay
and lesbian liberty and equality out of good-faith religious
convictions. 7 But religious arguments in the public square are
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different from government-imposed religious purposes. The
former must be freely allowed; the latter violate the Constitution.
We cannot and should not seek to banish religion-based
arguments from the public square. After all, religious beliefs may
inform the positions of individual citizens and lawmakers on a
wide variety of public policy questions—protecting the
environment, punishing sex crimes, or granting asylum to
refugees, just to name a few. Yet in such cases, the laws
themselves are not understood to be enacting religion.
Persuasive and non-hypothesized secular rationales are available
to describe the government’s purpose and interest in the law.
Such was not the case for laws punishing homosexuality and
disadvantaging homosexuals.
My purpose in this Essay is to illuminate the difference
between religious arguments and religious purposes in the gay and
lesbian rights cases; to demonstrate how the Court rejected laws
which lacked plausible secular purposes, without disparaging the
convictions of conscience which had led citizens and lawmakers
to support those laws.
Although they are grounded as a formal matter in the
Constitution’s guarantees of equal protection and due process,
the gay and lesbian rights decisions are informed by the
Establishment Clause value that government must make law
only on the basis of secular, rationally understandable and
defensible reasons, not religious doctrine or beliefs. 8 Nothing
about that idea suggests that arguments arising from personal
religious conscience should not be part of public debate. But it
does suggest that as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine, only secular government purposes should satisfy
review under the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process
Clause.
II. THE COURT’S REJECTION OF RELIGIOUS PURPOSES FOR
ANTI-GAY LAWS
Background
During the period from Romer to Obergefell, 1996 through
2015, the opposition to gay and lesbian political advancement
and legal equality was defined almost exclusively by religious
arguments and religious-political organizing. The major political
and legal organizations opposing gay and lesbian rights at the
state or national levels typically defined themselves by reference
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to some religious mission. 9 Beginning in the 1970s, opposition to
rights for gays and lesbians was “central” to the “political
practice and social vision” of American religious conservatives
(which usually meant Christian conservatives). 10 While it is
certainly true that “individual men and women who happen to
be secular can be homophobic to varying degrees,” the
opponents of marriage equality and other gay and lesbian rights
“are, for the most part, uniformly religious” and come to their
positions “in large part, as a result of their religion.” 11 In the
United States today, “in terms of political mobilization, social
movement activity, and organized public outcry, there is no
secular mobilization opposing equal rights for gays and
lesbians.” 12
It is not surprising, then, that the laws struck down by the
Supreme Court in Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, laws
which enacted various forms of punishment against
homosexuality or disfavored treatment against gays and
lesbians, all were impelled by identifiable religious purposes. To
be clear, this is not to say that every legislator or voter who
supported these laws did so for religious reasons. But the genesis
and justifications for all of the laws at issue in these cases can be
traced to religiously based views about homosexuality and samesex relationships, or to the derivative belief that gays and lesbians
present a moral threat to society.
Admittedly, these religious purposes are almost never
meaningfully explored in the Court’s opinions. Yet
understanding how religion drove the laws at issue in these cases
requires little more than basic familiarity with the social and
political history of the times. The Court’s opinions in these cases
often seem diffident about the role of religion in laws punishing
or disadvantaging gays and lesbians. While the Court sometimes
nods respectfully toward religious beliefs and arguments about
homosexuality, 13 it says little if anything about the underlying
religious rationales behind the laws struck down in these cases.
Nor does it comment on the religious-political activism operating
9
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in the background of these laws. Moreover, the religious
impetuses behind these laws often were obscured because the
government lawyers defending them eschewed discussing the
actual history behind the laws and devoted their energies instead
to hypothesizing non-religious purposes to attempt to justify
them. As a result, the analysis in these cases can seem opaque.
But at least this much is clear: in all four cases, the challenged
laws ultimately foundered on their lack of any actual,
discernible, non-hypothesized secular purpose.
Romer
Colorado’s Amendment 2, the issue in Romer, was a state
constitutional amendment which rolled back all existing nondiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians in Colorado
municipalities and prohibited the enactment of any new such
laws at the state or local level. 14 Colorado for Family Values
(“CFV”), which sponsored Amendment 2, was formed by
religious-conservative activists who were inspired by the views
that “America has deteriorated because it has turned away from
literal interpretations of the Bible, and fundamentalist church
teachings must play a bigger role in government.” 15 Amendment
2 was a “by-product of what religious right leaders had labeled a
national ‘cultural war’ over whose ‘family values’ would be
preeminent in society.” 16 The authors of a study of the campaign
to enact and defend Amendment 2 described it as “the first
statewide test of a new prototype for antigay initiatives resulting
from the collaboration of national and local conservative
organizations seeking to secure a role for religion in
government.” 17 CFV told the Court in its amicus brief in Romer
that the measure was impelled by concern over “the effect that
government legitimization of homosexuality would have on the
traditional family and community morality.” 18
In defending Amendment 2, the State of Colorado
acknowledged these religious purposes only obliquely. It claimed
that its state interests in the law were “respect for other citizens’
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords
or employers who have personal or religious objections to
homosexuality,” along with an “interest in conserving resources
to fight discrimination against other groups.” 19
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The Court treated Amendment 2 as essentially a politicalprocess problem. Making no reference to the religious impetus
behind Amendment 2 or to CFV’s explanation for the measure
it had developed and advocated, the Court professed a certain
amount of bewilderment about the law, calling it “at once too
narrow and too broad” and observing that it “confounds [the]
normal process of judicial review.” 20 The Court found
Amendment 2 to be “a status-based enactment divorced from
any factual context from which we could discern a relationship
to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons
undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit.” 21 The Court briefly considered the
state’s purported interests in Amendment 2—protecting certain
landlords and employers, and conserving resources to fight other
types of discrimination—but rejected them as “so far removed”
from the broad and harsh consequences of Amendment 2 that
“we find it impossible to credit them.” 22 The Court suggested
that the lack of serious and substantial government purposes
behind Amendment 2 gave rise to an inference that the measure’s
real purpose was “animus toward the class it affects.” 23 But it did
not discuss the campaign to enact Amendment 2 and did not
describe the animus as being grounded in religion.
Acknowledging the state’s professed concern for
landlords and employers with “personal or religious objections
to homosexuality” is the closest the majority opinion came to
acknowledging the religiously infused purposes behind
Amendment 2. Yet it is implausible to imagine that the justices
were unaware of the religious politics behind Amendment 2 and
similar initiatives. The majority’s reticence stands in contrast
with Justice Scalia’s dissent, which tellingly and accurately
identified Amendment 2 is the product of a “Kulturkampf” 24 (a
term denoting cultural struggle that was coined in reference to
the battles between secular and religious forces in Germany in
the late 19th century).
Romer treated homosexuality, in effect, as a morally
neutral phenomenon, and it discussed gays and lesbians as
essentially just another minority group entitled to use the
political process to advance its interests. Amendment 2, the
Court said, could not be reconciled with the principle, stemming
both from the Equal Protection Clause and the “idea of the rule
of law” itself, that “government and each its parts [should]
20
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remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” 25
In so doing, and by pointedly ignoring CFV’s explanation of the
religious purposes behind Amendment 2, the Court implicitly
but unmistakably signaled that the question of legal and political
rights for gays and lesbians should be resolved on secular terms.
Lawrence
Sodomy laws, the issue in Lawrence, historically were
grounded in the religious view that homosexual conduct is
unnatural. The core religious objection to homosexuality is that
it supposedly violates the design and purpose of sexuality for
humans as God created them. On this view, homosexual
conduct is “a clear perversion of, or turning away from, the core
activity of human sexuality, which is male-female marital
intercourse,” 26 and thus is “a crime against the nature of the
people involved.” 27 This religious view was long embedded in
law. William Blackstone, the great expositor of the common law,
denounced homosexuality as a “disgrace to human nature” and
inconsistent with “the express will of God.” 28
In Lawrence, the State of Texas, unlike Colorado in Romer,
did not shrink from forthrightly discussing the religious purposes
behind its sodomy law. Texas told the Court that the criminal
prohibition on homosexual conduct represented “the continued
expression of the State’s long-standing moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct, and the deterrence of such immoral sexual
activity,” and asserted that this was a legitimate state interest. 29
The Court did not comment on, or even acknowledge, the state’s
moral justifications. It simply concluded that the Texas sodomy
law “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” 30
The Court “examined the conduct at issue to see if it was
properly an aspect of liberty (as opposed to license), and then
asked the government to justify its restriction, which it failed to
do adequately.” 31 As in Romer, the Court insisted on applying a
secular legal framework—in this case, substantive due process—
to a law with an obvious religious pedigree.
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That is not to say the Court did not acknowledge that
sodomy laws have been defended with religious arguments.
“[F]or centuries,” it said, “there have been powerful voices to
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral,” condemnation that
was shaped at least in part by “religious beliefs. 32 The Court said
it respected that “[f]or many persons these are not trivial
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus
determine the course of their lives.” 33 But the critical passage of
the opinion came next:
These considerations do not answer
the question before us, however.
The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to
enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the
criminal law. “Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.” 34
In short, in a pluralistic society, religious beliefs and
arguments must be respected, but such a society may not impose
religious doctrine through civil law.
Windsor
Laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were driven almost
entirely by religious-political activist groups seeking to “defend”
marriage and roll back gay and lesbian political and legal
advancements. This was true both of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which was invalidated in Windsor,
and the state marriage bans which were struck down in Obergefell.
For example, The Alliance Defending Freedom, the legal
group which defended California’s Proposition 9 in the first
federal lawsuit against a state marriage equality ban and which
has been active in a large number of other cases opposing gay
rights, describes its mission as helping “Christians . . . unite in
order to defend religious freedom before it [is] too late.” 35 The
National Organization for Marriage, one of the leading national
groups that fought against marriage equality (and, now, other
matters of equality for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender
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persons), describes itself as “working to defend marriage and the
faith communities that sustain it.” 36
Gary Simson has argued that both DOMA and the state
marriage bans could be “readily understood as examples of
lawmakers . . ., consciously or unconsciously, incorporating into
law their religious beliefs or . . . the religious beliefs of many of
their constituents.” 37 Thus, Simson argued, “regardless of what
lawmakers opposed to same-sex marriage may be willing to state
publicly as their reasons for voting against same-sex marriage,
courts should find that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
violate the Establishment Clause.” 38
In enacting the federal DOMA, Congress aligned itself
squarely and expressly with those who opposed same-sex
marriage for reasons of religion. As the House of Representatives
put it in the official Judiciary Committee report on DOMA:
For many Americans, there is to
this issue of marriage an overtly
moral or religious aspect that
cannot be divorced from the
practicalities. It is true, of course,
that the civil act of marriage is
separate from the recognition and
blessing of that act by a religious
institution. But the fact that there
are distinct religious and civil
components of marriage does not
mean that the two do not intersect.
Civil laws that permit only
heterosexual marriage reflect and
honor a collective moral judgment
about human sexuality. This
judgment entails both moral
disapproval of homosexuality, and
a
moral
conviction
that
heterosexuality better comports
with traditional (especially JudeoChristian)
morality.
As
36
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Representative Henry Hyde, the
Chairman
of
the
Judiciary
Committee, stated during the
Subcommittee markup of H.R.
3396: ‘‘[S]ame-sex marriage, if
sanctified by the law, if approved by
the law, legitimates a public union,
a legal status that most people . . .
feel ought to be illegitimate . . . .
And in so doing it trivializes the
legitimate status of marriage and
demeans it by putting a stamp of
approval . . . on a union that many
people . . . think is immoral.’’ It is
both inevitable and entirely
appropriate that the law should
reflect such moral judgments. H.R.
3396 serves the government’s
legitimate interest in protecting the
traditional
moral
teachings
reflected
in
heterosexual-only
marriage laws. 39
In Windsor, the Court treated this language about
morality and religion as, in essence, a smoking gun which
confirmed that DOMA was not grounded in any constitutionally
proper secular purpose. As it had in Romer, the Court raised the
likelihood of “animus” lurking behind DOMA. 40 But unlike
Romer and Lawrence, the Court in Windsor was more direct in its
rejection of religious purposes. Citing to the above passage of the
House Judiciary Committee report, the Court observed that
“[t]he history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text
demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex
marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of
their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the
federal statute. It was its essence.” 41
In the Windsor litigation, something called the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives
(“BLAG”) had stepped in to defend DOMA when the Obama
administration declined to. BLAG in effect disavowed the actual
purposes Congress had set forth for DOMA by not addressing
them. Instead, BLAG devoted most of its merits brief in the
Supreme Court to setting forth a list of benign sounding
39
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hypothesized secular purposes it said supported the law, such as
“ensuring that similarly-situated couples will have the same
federal benefits regardless of the state in which they happen to
reside” 42 and “avoid[ing] uncertain and unpredictable (but
presumed negative) effects on the federal fisc.” 43 But the Court’s
opinion completely ignored BLAG’s post-hoc rationalizations
for DOMA.
Thus, Windsor suggests that not only must a law stand on
secular, rather than purely religious, purposes, those secular
purposes also must be plausible and genuine, not simply made
up for use in litigation.
Obergefell
The fourth and most recent case in the Court’s
gay/lesbian rights quadrilogy, Obergefell, held that state laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the fundamental right to
marry under the Due Process Clause.
By the time Obergefell was briefed and argued, government
lawyers defending the marriage bans were aware that it was
untenable to rely on religious purposes to justify these laws. And
so, faced with the fact that they could not acknowledge the actual
(that is, religiously inspired) reasons why these laws were
promoted and enacted, the states, like BLAG in Windsor, turned
to hypothesized purposes—that is, purposes which were
supposedly served by the laws, but which were constructed posthoc, in an effort to save the laws. “It matters not,” Ohio’s brief
told the Supreme Court, “if the reasons offered in court are
[actually] the reasons why lawmakers (or voters) approved the
law.” 44 The states relied mainly on the argument of “responsible
procreation.” As Michigan’s brief to the Court explained this
argument:
[M]arriage as a public institution—
separate from other relationships
that have an emotional connection-springs from a feature of oppositesex relationships that is biologically
different than all other relationships
(including opposite-sex platonic
friendships
and
same-sex
relationships): the sexual union of a
42
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man and a woman produces
something more than just an
emotional relationship between two
people—it produces, without the
involvement of third parties or even
a conscious decision, the possibility
of creating a new life. Michigan’s
marriage definition is designed to
stabilize such relationships, to
promote procreation within them,
and to be the expected standard for
opposite-sex couples engaged in
sexual relations.
The Court did not buy it, dismissing the responsible-procreation
rationale as “unrealistic” and “‘wholly illogical.’” 45
The Court did not seek to identify any other purposes
behind the state marriage bans, religious or otherwise. But it did
address the difference between religious advocacy in the public
square, and state action which advances religious purposes, and
it did so in a more candid and direct manner than it had in the
three previous gay and lesbian rights cases. The Court
acknowledged that many people “who deem same-sex marriage
to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and
honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they
nor their beliefs are disparaged here.” 46 But to respect religious
arguments about public policy is not to acquiesce in the
enactment of religious purposes. “[W]hen that sincere, personal
opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own
liberty is then denied.” 47
III. GAY RIGHTS, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY
The Court’s insistence in the gay and lesbian rights cases
that laws must be justified by secular purposes rests on a sound
and, frankly, mainstream understanding of the relationship
between law and religion in a pluralistic democracy. After all,
the requirement of a secular purpose, not a purpose to advance
or impose religion, is a core principle of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. In the gay and lesbian rights cases, the Court
45
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applied the same principle through the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses. Yet at the same time, the Court tried to make
clear that it had no intention to disparage or constrain religious
argument and advocacy.
That latter point may be cold comfort for citizens and
legislators who believe they were entitled to enact religious
beliefs into law. But there is nothing unusual or objectionable
about drawing a clear line, as the Court did in Obergefell, between
religious arguments in public debate and religious purposes in
state action. As the distinguished religion and law scholar
Michael J. Perry has argued, in regulating human conduct,
“neither legislators nor other public officials should rely on a
religious argument about the requirements of human well-being
unless a persuasive independent secular argument reaches the
same conclusion.” 48 In the same vein, Douglas Laycock—like
Perry, a scholar who is certainly not a strict separationist when
it comes to the relationship between government and religion—
argues that the Constitution “does not limit the arguments that a
free people can make in political debate,” nor does it “limit what
the people can do to influence government; rather, it limits what
government can do to the people.” 49 Simply put, the Constitution
“limits political outputs, the laws that government can enact—
not political inputs, the arguments that citizens can make.” 50
In this Essay, I have sought to demonstrate how the Court
in the gay and lesbian rights cases worked within the sort of
framework Laycock suggests. An enduring and important legacy
of Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell is not only how they
advanced the dignity of gays and lesbians, but also the lessons
they provide about how First Amendment values can inform
Fourteenth Amendment analysis of equality and liberty.
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